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ABSTRACT 
Public debt in the OECD area passed annual GDP in 2011 and is still rising. For many countries, just 
stabilising debt - let alone bringing it down to a more sustainable level - is a major challenge. The debt 
overhangs can affect growth through channels such as raising the cost of capital. The main focus of this 
paper however is the implications for growth both in the short term and in the long term of reducing debt 
levels. Consolidation needs are large and most of the reduction in debt will need to come from 
improvements in the primary balance. In the short term, the pace of consolidation needs to balance 
consolidation requirements with the effects of fiscal retrenchment on aggregate demand. The trade-off will 
depend on the choice of fiscal instrument and on the ability of monetary policy to accommodate 
consolidation. However, other things being equal, a slow consolidation will ultimately require more effort 
to meet a fixed debt target. In this context, consolidation should aim to use instruments that are friendly to 
long-term growth. There is scope to improve budgetary positions by reforming transfer systems, raising the 
efficiency of public services, eliminating certain tax expenditures and collecting additional revenues from 
less distortionary tax bases. 
JEL Codes: H62; H63; H68 
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation; Growth 
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FISCAL CONSOLIDATION NEEDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH 
Douglas Sutherland* 
Introduction 
1. Public debt in the OECD area passed annual GDP in 2011 and is still rising. For many countries, 
just stabilising debt - let alone bringing it down to a more sustainable level - is a major challenge. Concerns 
about debt sustainability have manifested themselves in the euro area debt crisis, but could spread beyond 
that area. 
2. Both high debt levels and efforts to reduce them can affect growth. The debt overhangs can affect 
growth through channels such as raising the cost of capital and increasing the burden of distortionary 
taxation. The main focus of this paper however is on the implications of reducing debt levels for growth 
both in the short term and in the long term. In the short term, the trade-off between macroeconomic 
stabilisation and consolidation creates a particular challenge, especially in an environment when many 
countries need to implement fiscal consolidation more-or-less simultaneously and with policy interest rates 
close to the zero lower bound giving little scope for monetary policy to accommodate fiscal consolidation. 
In this context, fiscal consolidation needs to be carefully designed, notably in the choice of policy 
instruments which will affect the trade-off not only with short-term but also long-term growth. 
3. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: after a brief review of the lead up to the current debt 
debacle, the second section looks at the impact of high debt on economic growth and establishes 
consolidation needs, relying principally on fiscal gap calculations, and considers the factors likely to 
influence debt dynamics; the next section discusses the combined challenge of consolidation and 
macroeconomic stabilisation. This section also discusses the short-term impact through the multiplier 
effects of different instruments, with pension reform representing an extreme case of little initial impact 
but potentially large long-term impact on fiscal sustainability; the following section discusses available 
policy instruments and their implications for long-term growth. A final section concludes. 
The size of debt overhangs 
4. Debt levels in the OECD have trended upwards since the early 1970s, with countries often 
insufficiently ambitious in bringing debt levels down during expansions. Indeed, during the upswing that 
preceded the recent crisis, underlying deficits were not reduced much, such that debt levels were not 
brought down, notably in Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States. In some cases, declines in 
revenue shares during the expansion suggest that governments were engaging in a pro-cyclical easing of 
fiscal policy – something which has been a consistent feature of policy in some European countries since 
the early 1970s (Égert, 2010). The impact of lower interest rates and in some cases lower debt on debt 
servicing and the apparent strength of revenues seduced some governments into cutting taxes and relaxing 
control over spending. Indeed, new estimates of underlying budget balances that adjust not only for the 
effect of the economic cycle but also take account of asset price effects on revenues suggest significantly 
weaker balances as a share of GDP in a number of countries, notably Ireland and Spain (Price and Dang, 
2011). As such, when fiscal positions appeared to improve before the financial crisis, they often gave an 
impression that was too flattering.  And in retrospect, given the weaknesses in financial sector prudential 
policy, fiscal positions were insufficiently robust given the scale of the liabilities and contingent liabilities 
that some governments had to assume during the crisis. 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the OECD or 
its member countries. Secretarial assistance is gratefully acknowledged from Lyn Urmston. This paper draws 
heavily on Elmeskov and Sutherland (2012). 
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5. What sets the crisis apart is how widespread and rapid the build-up of debt has been, making the 
need for fiscal consolidation pressing for most OECD countries. The automatic stabilisers played a role 
with spending on unemployment benefits surging and tax revenues evaporating. Tax revenues were further 
dented by asset price movements, which had boosted revenues in the pre-crisis period. Spending further 
jumped due to support packages and assuming various liabilities. In addition, a downward level shift in 
potential output as an effect of the crisis effectively meant that prevailing levels of spending became 
inconsistent with pre-existing tax rates and implied a need to tighten just to stand still. For the OECD as a 
whole, gross government debt is expected to rise to unprecedented levels, exceeding 100% of GDP for the 
first time in 2011 (Figure 1). In Japan, this ratio has risen to over 200% of GDP. Even in some low-debt 
countries gross debt increased quite strongly. Only Norway and Switzerland have bucked the trend, 
reducing debt levels. 
Figure 1. Gross government financial liabilities 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 89 Database. 
6. In emerging market economies, less debt build-up occurred over the crisis and debt levels are 
often more favourable than in many OECD countries, not least because high growth rates tend to ease debt 
dynamics. Nonetheless, in a number of countries debt levels are not negligible. In Brazil and India, debt 
levels were around 65% of GDP at the end of 2010. Fiscal consolidation is underway in both countries and 
Brazil is already running a relatively large primary surplus. For India, consolidation will be difficult due to 
large spending pressures and possibly weaker revenue growth. In China, the official debt burden was low 
at 19% of GDP in 2010. However, off budget sub-central government and state enterprise debt could 
potentially raise total debt well over one third of GDP at the end of 2010, with contingent liabilities in the 
financial sector of uncertain magnitude and the on-going push to provide affordable housing potentially 
adding to debt.  
Consequences of high debt levels for growth 
7. High public debt levels may have adverse effects on growth. Higher debt loads could affect 
output by raising the costs of capital or more speculatively through higher distortionary taxes, inflation or 
greater volatility in policy. Cournède (2010) demonstrated the potential impact of higher corporate 
financing costs, which may be a consequence of not only a normalisation of the artificially low risk premia 
that prevailed before the crisis but also of crowding out due to higher government issuance of debt. A 
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higher cost of capital is likely to reduce the capital-to-labour ratio and hence productivity. Using the 
assumptions embodied in the OECD’s medium-term baseline and a production function with three factors 
(labour, business sector capital and oil), the calculations suggest that the level of GDP in the long run 
would fall by just over 2% in the United States and 2.6% in the euro area for a normalisation of interest 
rates following the crisis, which would entail a real interest rate shock of around one percentage point in 
both the United States and the euro area. If higher government debt does lead to crowding out, with the real 
interest rate shock rising by around an additional percentage point, then the fall in GDP could be more 
substantial, with the level of output falling by around 5% in both the United States and euro area. 
8. The effects of higher costs of capital on the intensity of capital in production should essentially 
lead to a level shift in potential output and therefore to growth rate effects over some finite period only. 
More long-lasting effects on economic growth could arise to the extent higher costs of capital lead to 
reduced investment in research and development. More speculative and uncertain combinations of OECD 
research suggests that if the fall in potential output by 3% as a result of lower capital intensity were 
combined with the above higher cost of capital, then the stock of R&D could fall by 5.4%, which would 
reduce long-run total factor productivity (TFP) by 0.7%, based on an estimated long-run elasticity (Guellec 
et al., 2004). In practice, evidence on TFP growth in OECD countries before and after past crises suggests 
that experience is very heterogeneous (Figure 2). Since impacts of debt via R&D should be expected to 
accrue via TFP, this underlines the need to treat the calculations with care. 
Figure 2. TFP growth following severe downturns 
 
Note: Change in the average annual growth rate comparing the five years following the start of the downturn with the five years 
preceding it. Darker bars note severe downturns associated with financial crises. The darker bars denote downturns that are 
associated with banking crises, see Haugh and Ollivaud, (2009). 
9. Empirical work has identified various thresholds in the relationship between public debt and 
growth. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) found that growth rates in both developed and 
developing countries where the public debt to GDP ratio exceeds 90% are about 1% point lower than in the 
less indebted countries (Cecchetti et al., 2011 find a similar threshold effect). In a similar vein, Caner et al. 
(2010) found a threshold effect on growth rates at 77% of GDP for a large sample of countries, with the 
threshold being lower for emerging markets, and Kumar and Woo (2010) found that a 10 percentage point 
increase in debt reduces annual real per capita GDP growth by 0.2 percentage points per year, with the 
effect being smaller for advanced economies and some evidence for non-linearity beyond a debt/GDP ratio 
of 90% of GDP. 
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10. Indeed, fitting density functions to growth rates of OECD countries suggests that growth is 
typically lower in periods that follow years of high debt (Figure 3). This is more obvious when looking at 
growth rates over a short window of 5 years, where some of the effect may reflect that high debt is 
followed by consolidation with negative effects on the cycle. However, the effect appears to persist over 
10 years when cyclical effects of consolidation should matter less. Even so, the relationship could be 
spurious to some degree given the secular tendency for debt levels to drift up and growth rates to trend 
down which may account for some of the relationship. Moreover, causality may be less than clear with, for 
example, less well managed countries likely to have both high debt and low growth. 
11. In sum, high debt levels are likely to have negative impacts on growth. Hence, there are good 
reasons for many countries to reduce their debt overhangs, including creating room to react to future 
shocks. Reducing debt in turn has implications for growth both in the short and long term, with the scale of 
the necessary adjustment likely to give some indication of how painful fiscal consolidation will be. We 
turn to this issue in the next section. 
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Figure 3. Growth conditional on past debt levels 
Left hand Panel: growth in the following 5 years; right hand panel: growth in the following 10 years 
Top panel: debt threshold 50% of GDP; middle panel debt threshold 70% of GDP; bottom panel debt threshold 90% of 
GDP 
 
Note: The distributions are kernel densities for growth rates in the subsequent 5 and 10 years when growth rates are above and 
below the given threshold (see Box 1 for a description of the data). 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
-.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12
High Debt > 50% of  GDP Low Debt
D
e
n
si
ty
0
10
20
30
40
50
-.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12
High Debt > 50% of  GDP Low Debt
D
e
n
si
ty
0
10
20
30
40
50
-.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12
High Debt > 70% of  GDP Low Debt
D
e
n
si
ty
0
10
20
30
40
50
-.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12
High Debt > 70% of  GDP Low Debt
D
e
n
si
ty
0
10
20
30
40
50
-.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12
High Debt > 90% of  GDP Low Debt
D
e
n
si
ty
0
10
20
30
40
50
-.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12
High Debt > 90% of  GDP Low Debt
D
e
n
si
ty
 9 
Size of adjustment 
12. Facing large debt overhangs, many countries have already started fiscal consolidation, which has 
implications for economic growth in the short term. In some cases, notably for those countries most under 
pressure from the bond markets, the on-going and announced tightening is substantial, rapid and unusually 
correlated by historical comparison (Figure 4). Between the trough (measured by the underlying primary 
balance) following the onset of the crisis, which was 2009 for most countries, and the projected value for 
2012, five countries are expected to tighten by more than 5% of GDP (Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain). In 11 other countries, underlying primary balances are expected to have tightened by more than 
2% of GDP. Recent policy announcement imply that these numbers would be larger if recalculated today. 
Figure 4. Cumulative fiscal tightening between the deficit trough and 2012 
Change in underlying primary balance 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 90 Database. 
13. Additional fiscal consolidation will be required beyond 2012. Recent OECD work has assessed 
these post-2012 needs, both in terms of stabilising debt over the medium term and also meeting prudent 
long-term debt targets. The consolidation requirements to stabilise debt (OECD, 2011c), are based on 
stylised assumptions about a sustained and gradual annual tightening of the underlying primary balance by 
0.5% of GDP until debt stabilization is reached. The long-term fiscal gaps on the other hand make an 
alternative stylised assumption that the tightening will be implemented immediately and sustained until 
2050 to meet a specific debt target (Merola and Sutherland, 2011). Both sets of assumptions ignore the 
implications for output, which will obviously be important (discussed below). Both approaches come to 
similar conclusions on the need for consolidation, but here we concentrate on the long-term fiscal gap 
calculations, which will be used later in the paper to illustrate consolidation options. 
Fiscal gaps 
14. The fiscal gap shows the immediate and permanent improvement in the underlying primary 
balance that is required to ensure that debt meets a target at a certain point in time, based on a simplified 
model of the economy and a number of assumptions about growth, interest rates, inflation and underlying 
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fiscal policy (see appendix).
 1
 The presentation of the results below typically reports the fiscal gaps for 
ensuring gross financial liabilities is 50% of GDP in 2050 (Box 2). This is intended to be illustrative and 
not normative. Indeed, different debt targets will be appropriate for different countries. For example, a low 
gross debt target may be less compelling for countries with large government financial asset holdings. In 
other cases, the public has demonstrated a preference for very low levels of debt. Countries with large 
implicit liabilities due to a large financial sector may wish to err on the side of caution. Although the 50% 
target is arbitrary it may nonetheless be supported by some arguments. Thus, empirical estimation suggests 
that changes in the functioning of the economy occur around debt levels of 70-80% of GDP. For example, 
interest rate effects of debt seem to become more pronounced (Egert, 2010), offsetting saving responses to 
discretionary policy changes become more powerful (Roehn, 2010) and, as illustrated above, trend growth 
seems to suffer. Building in a safety margin to avoid exceeding the 70-80% levels in a downturn may 
suggest aiming for 50% or thereabout during normal times. In any case, over a very long period such as up 
to 2050, the size of fiscal gap does not depend strongly on the particular target debt level (see below). 
Box 2. Debt objectives 
Various choices have to be made in setting a debt target: 
The target can be based on either gross or net debt/financial liabilities. Gross financial liabilities are a visible 
headline indicator and typically the measure used in empirical analysis. Net financial liabilities are in principle more 
appropriate when considering long-term sustainability, though government net worth, which also takes into account 
non-financial assets (the public capital stock), may be the more appropriate when also considering inter-generational 
issues. However, there are serious problems due to lack of comparability across countries, particularly when valuing 
government non-financial assets. Furthermore, government assets may not be easily used to offset liabilities, at least 
in the short term. For example, it may not be advisable to privatise public enterprises operating in sectors with 
significant market failures or when financial markets could not easily absorb large asset sales. There may also be 
asymmetries across levels of government and with social security funds between the holding of assets and liabilities. 
The scope of the public sector can vary. For example, the debt target may affect only the central government, 
general government or an even wider definition, including for instance, public enterprises. The choice can make a 
sizeable difference. In the United Kingdom, recent whole of government accounts estimated net liabilities to be 84.5% 
of GDP in 2009-10, whereas the national accounts net liabilities measure was 52.8% of GDP (HM Treasury, 2011). 
The target should address the effect of ageing on entitlement spending (ageing is not the primary driver of health 
spending but is used as a catch-all label here). The appropriate degree of consolidation will need to take into account 
the impact of ageing-related spending. Ageing-related spending pressures stem from two factors. First, in many OECD 
countries spending ramps up with the demographic transition as the post-war “baby boomers” move into retirement. As 
this transition is either already happening or is imminent, the policy options are limited. In this light, the “hump” in 
spending may need to be absorbed and adds to the consolidation requirement. A second, uncertain but potentially 
huge or even infinite, ageing effect on spending stems from longevity, which has been more or less steadily rising for 
more than 150 years across OECD countries. In this case, the appropriate response is to reform pension and other 
benefit systems, such as long-term care, rather than to attempt to pre-save to finance the rising ageing-related 
spending. Attempting to pre-save for future increase in longevity rather than adjusting pension and other programmes 
ould be unfair across generations and would be difficult in light of uncertainty concerning the development of longevity. 
More generally, the target should also consider inter-generational fairness. Pay-as-you-go pension systems 
present an obvious example of a transfer of resources between generations. Likewise, “excessive” deficits can transfer 
liabilities to future generations. In other cases, investment can create assets which will be enjoyed by future 
generations. As such, the degree of consolidation will need to consider the source of the transfer between generations 
and how much of a burden it is fair to pass onto future generations. 
                                                     
1. Following a severe economic dislocation, estimating potential output and thereby the underlying primary 
balance represents a challenge. While the fiscal gap simulations do not directly assess uncertainties about 
potential output, the variety of simulations reported below reveal how varying different parameters affect 
the fiscal gap calculations. 
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15. The fiscal gaps should be seen as giving a common metric for assessing the need for fiscal 
consolidation rather than being normative about how such a consolidation should be implemented. When 
the fiscal gap is large, it would be difficult to implement such a large consolidation effort immediately. 
Furthermore, sustaining the fiscal policy tightening, even seemingly modest ones, over very long periods 
may also present a considerable challenge. Finally, as the fiscal gaps are based on meeting arbitrary debt 
targets in 2050, the evolution of gross debt is unlikely to be stable as a share of GDP at the end of the 
simulation. In some cases, for example, the fiscal gap will involve substantial undershooting of the debt 
target early in the simulation, masking pressures on public finances that will continue to mount beyond the 
end of the simulation. 
Baseline simulation 
16. The baseline simulation shows the immediate tightening of the underlying primary balance in 
2013 needed to ensure that gross financial liabilities are 50% of GDP in 2050. The baseline assumes that 
pension, health and long-term care spending is constant as a share of GDP and, as such, the fiscal gaps 
present the minimum that is required to meet consolidation needs in the case when pensions and health 
schemes are reformed to alleviate any upward pressure on spending or when other spending categories are 
curtailed and taxes raised to accommodate such spending pressures (simulations incorporating spending 
pressures emanating from pensions, health and long-term care are presented below). 
17. Fiscal gaps differ across countries mainly because of large differences in underlying deficits at 
the starting point and to some extent due to differences in the level of initial debt (Appendix Table). 
Countries already undertaking large fiscal consolidations (Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Spain) generally 
face moderate fiscal gaps on the assumption that the present large improvements in underlying primary 
balances are maintained. Countries where underlying deficits are expected to remain substantial in 2012 
face much larger fiscal gaps. For example, the fiscal gaps for Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand exceed 5% of GDP. On the other hand, a number of countries – Korea, Luxembourg, 
Sweden and Switzerland – do not face any additional tightening requirements to meet the debt target. It 
may seem ironic that euro area countries with relatively modest fiscal gaps are the victims of a virulent 
debt crisis whereas other countries with much larger fiscal gaps enjoy very low bond yields at present. This 
partly reflects concerns about potential needs for intervention in euro area banking systems, but also that 
euro area debt essentially corresponds to foreign currency denominated debt for the individual country. 
Lately, pressures may also have reflected increased concerns about the integrity of the euro area more 
generally. 
18. When spending pressures projected to arise from health and long-term care and pensions are 
included, all countries, with the exception of Sweden, will require significant additional fiscal 
consolidation. 
 In the case of health care spending, higher levels of spending are not necessarily undesirable, but 
financing higher spending can create difficulties (Hall and Jones, 2007). Two different sets of 
health care spending projections are used (Oliveira-Martins and de la Maisonneuve, 2006). The 
average projected increases in health and long-term care spending by 2050 are 3½ per cent of 
GDP in a low spending scenario, when it is assumed that spending increases above those related 
to demographic change and to a unitary income elasticity will gradually fade, and around 6% of 
GDP in a high spending one. As the projected increases are relatively similar across countries, 
because health spending is not primarily driven by demographics but rather to a large extent by 
expected supply developments, the impact on the fiscal gaps does not vary much across 
countries. Nonetheless, the fiscal gaps rise over 1.5% of GDP in Canada, the Czech Republic, 
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Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland when greater cost pressures affect health spending 
(Figure 5). 
 Including pension spending alters radically the fiscal gaps for many countries relative to the 
baseline scenario (Figure 5).
2
 The fiscal gaps of the countries facing the largest pension 
problems, such as Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands underscore that meeting these 
challenges would be better addressed by reform rather than pre-saving. In some cases, such as 
Greece and Spain, reforms to the pension systems in 2010, which are incorporated in the 
projections, have addressed significant pressures emanating from this source. In Sweden and 
Poland, the notionally-defined contribution pension system means that no additional or even less 
tightening is required to meet a gross financial liabilities debt target of 50% of GDP in 2050. 
Figure 5. Fiscal gaps, baseline and with health and long-term care spending and pensions 
Immediate rise in the underlying primary balance needed to bring gross financial liabilities to 50% of GDP in 2050 
 
Note: “Low” health assumes policy action curbs health spending growth. “High” health is the additional cost pressure in the absence 
of these policy actions. 
19. The fiscal gaps do not change markedly relative to the baseline if alternative debt targets are 
used. This occurs because even relatively small changes to underlying fiscal positions add up when 
maintained for 40 years. It is the same effect that lies behind initial debt levels having an only modest 
effect on fiscal gaps compared with initial deficit levels. Taking government financial assets into 
consideration may indicate that fiscal positions are in relatively better shape, notably for Japan. In other 
cases, such as in Finland, the large net asset position reflects pre-funding for pension spending. 
                                                     
2. The pension projections are based on OECD (2011a). For Greece and Spain, estimates of the impact of 
reforms in 2010 and a change in the law in 2011, respectively, are used. For the United States, estimates 
from CBO (2011) are used. For most European countries, public sector occupational schemes are included. 
This is not the case for Canada and Japan. The path of projected public pension spending is phased in so 
that the spending profile follows the profile of the old-age dependency ratio. 
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Debt dynamics 
20. How will the debt overhang be worked off? A review of episodes of declining debt since the 
early 1970s suggests that improvements in the primary balance are more consistently important in reducing 
debt, though at times interest rate and growth dynamics can help.
3
 One possible decomposition of past debt 
developments shows the difference between the inertial contributions of debt dynamics on the one hand 
and the more direct policy lever of the primary balance on the other (Table 1). When debt has been falling 
in recent decades this has been typically accompanied by the primary balance having a negative effect on 
debt. The real interest rate and real growth rate effects often offset one another. That said, in some 
countries during the 1970s, negative real interest rates had an effect allowing them to run larger primary 
deficits. 
Table 1. Episodes of falling debt: the contribution of the primary balance, inflation and growth 
 
Note: the decomposition is based on the relationship:         
  
   
 
     
 
 
   
 
        , where d is the debt as a ratio of GDP, r  
is the real interest rate, g is the real growth rate and pb is the primary balance as a ratio of GDP. 
The effects of stronger productivity growth 
21. Going forward, debt dynamics can be influenced by stronger productivity growth. To illustrate 
this, simple calculations reveal the effect of productivity growth on debt levels over a 10 year period 
(Table 2). Extending the calculation beyond the medium term would have a larger impact. Nonetheless, for 
the countries with the largest fiscal gaps, while productivity gains would help, the fiscal challenge remains 
large. In these calculations, interest rates are assumed not to change, although they would likely rise with a 
                                                     
3. In earlier periods of very high debt, overhangs were worked off by rapid growth, primary balances and 
negative real returns, helped in some cases by financial repression (see below). For example, Hall and 
Sargent (2011) estimate that the debt reduction as a per cent of GDP in the United States between 1945 and 
1974 was mainly the result of high growth and primary surpluses with about one-fifth of the reduction 
stemming from negative real returns due principally to high inflation. 
Episode primary balance real growth real interest 
Australia 1996-2008 -27.7 -18.1 -24.0 -11.6 17.6
Belgium 1994-2007 -52.6 -33.7 -64.0 -37.8 63.9
1971-1976 -11.7 -0.3 5.7 -10.9 -1.1
Canda 1997-2000 -19.6 -19.8 -21.7 -17.1 25.5
2002-2007 -16.1 -16.6 -13.6 -11.6 17.1
1985-1989 -12.5 -15.3 -31.7 -7.5 21.3
Denmark 1994-2007 -58.0 -27.3 -41.3 -23.0 34.5
1999-2001 -6.0 -0.8 -3.4 -5.8 6.8
France 1999-2001 -2.4 7.7 -5.0 -4.0 8.8
Germany 1999-2003 -15.7 -9.2 -16.6 -9.2 14.6
Italy 1988-1991 -13.6 -10.8 -11.2 -14.0 10.0
Japan 1999-2007 -33.2 -27.3 -19.8 -19.3 3.2
Spain 1985-1990 -24.6 -13.5 -25.8 -9.4 13.4
Sweden 1997-2003 -23.6 -6.8 -17.9 -15.9 18.7
1972-1976 -20.1 -6.6 8.6 -6.9 -12.8
United Kingdom 1978-1981 -11.8 1.1 4.5 -1.5 -4.8
1985-1990 -18.3 3.4 -9.1 -9.1 11.9
1999-2001 -12.2 -9.6 -12.1 -4.6 5.4
1972-1974 -5.4 -5.9 -1.5 -4.5 -0.7
United States 1976-1979 -3.5 -4.5 -0.2 -5.4 -0.2
1994-2001 -17.4 -12.1 -15.6 -18.5 24.7
Total change in 
gross financial 
liabilities, %GDP
of which
Change after 
accounting for 
valuation effects
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boost in productivity, thereby undoing some of the potential gains. On the other hand, if government 
spending did not rise fully in line with GDP, the gains from higher growth could be substantial by 
improving the underlying primary balance. 
Table 2. The effect of higher productivity on the real growth effect 
Reduction in initial debt stock as per cent of GDP after 10 years with growth in the baseline (OECD Economic 
Outlook 89 medium term baseline) and with growth rates raised by 0.25 and 0.5 basis points.  
 
Inflation and interest rates 
22. One possible way to deal with a high debt level is to erode it through higher inflation, but this is 
likely to be accompanied by drawbacks. Higher inflation is most likely to have an effect in an environment 
when debt is non-indexed, maturity is relatively long and rollover requirements are low, given that interest 
rates are likely to respond to higher inflation rates.
4
 Even in this case, simulations presented in the OECD 
                                                     
4. Aizenman and Marion (2009) show for the United States that the maturity structure of publically-held debt 
is shorter than in the post-war period, reducing the incentive to use inflation to reduce the debt overhang. 
On the other hand, a larger share of debt is held by foreigners, which pulls in the opposite direction. 
Initial debt level
% of GDP Baseline + 0.25 basis points + 0.5 basis ponts
Australia 31 7.2 7.5 8.0
Austria 82 12.9 14.2 15.6
Belgium 100 13.5 15.2 16.9
Canada 88 15.2 16.5 17.9
Czech Republic 51 10.7 11.3 12.0
Denmark 60 8.2 9.2 10.2
Estonia 19 4.1 4.3 4.6
Finland 66 12.1 13.1 14.1
France 100 16.0 17.6 19.2
Germany 87 9.5 11.1 12.7
Greece 159 35.8 37.7 39.9
Hungary 81 11.5 12.9 14.2
Iceland 120 26.7 28.1 29.8
Ireland 126 34.8 35.9 37.4
Isreal 70 19.5 20.2 21.1
Italy 128 14.7 17.1 19.4
Japan 219 32.8 36.4 40.0
Korea 33 7.5 7.9 8.4
Luxembourg 24 5.9 6.1 6.4
Netherlands 75 8.5 9.9 11.3
New Zealand 52 10.8 11.5 12.2
Norway 51 11.8 12.4 13.1
Poland 66 10.7 11.7 12.8
Portugal 116 26.7 28.1 29.6
Slovak Republic 51 10.2 10.9 11.6
Slovenia 56 6.8 7.9 8.9
Spain 75 17.8 18.7 19.7
Sweden 41 6.9 7.5 8.2
Switzerland 37 6.0 6.5 7.1
United Kingdom 93 17.1 18.5 19.9
United States 107 22.3 23.7 25.2
Real growth effect, as % of GDP
 15 
Economic Outlook 89 show that the contribution of inflation to reducing debt is modest (OECD, 2011c). 
For a standard country with debt around 100% of GDP and an average maturity structure, 1 percentage 
point on inflation would typically reduce the debt ratio by some 5-6 percentage points assuming the 
interest rate on new borrowing rose in tandem with inflation. Getting debt to even lower levels would 
correspondingly require higher permanent inflation rates. The drawbacks of such an approach to reducing 
debt would be felt principally through the negative growth effects of higher rates of inflation, some of 
which may accrue through associated higher price volatility as well as distortions created through 
interactions with the tax and benefit system (Edey, 1994). 
23. For higher inflation to make a marked dent in debt levels, some form of financial repression 
would probably be needed to ensure interest rates remain low relative to inflation.
5
 Following the end of 
World War II until the beginning of the 1980s, financial repression often played a role in reducing the huge 
stocks of debt accumulated during the war. Reinhart and Sbracia (2011) estimate that financial repression 
contributed to a “liquidation effect” which, for example, amounted to a reduction of Italian government 
debt of around 5% annually. Figure 4 presents suggestive evidence of financial repression during the 
1970s, particularly after mid-decade when inflation was no longer surging, during which a large wedge 
existed between the yield on 10 year government bonds and the effective interest rate the government was 
paying on debt. While financial repression may be one avenue to liquidate debt there are adverse 
consequences. For example, Jonung (2011) argues that the imbalances which developed as a cause of 
financial repression contributed directly to financial crises in the Nordic countries in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
Figure 4. Borrowing rates in Italy 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 90 Database. 
Dynamics of adjustment 
24. The previous section suggested that relying on favourable debt dynamics to address the debt 
overhang may not be a viable option. Hence, improvements in the primary balance are called for. The pace 
of consolidation needs to balance consolidation requirements with the effects of fiscal retrenchment on 
aggregate demand. Ideally, in the short term, the pace should depend on the state of the public finances, the 
strength of the recovery, the ability of monetary policy to cushion the demand effects of fiscal tightening, 
                                                     
5. Financial repression includes directed lending to government by captive domestic lenders, caps on interest 
rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements and a tighter connection between government and the 
operation of banks. 
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and the need to signal a credible commitment to fiscal consolidation. However, there are significant 
uncertainties surrounding several of these factors, which make gauging the appropriate pace of 
consolidation complicated. These uncertainties would argue for a consolidation strategy that could be 
implemented flexibly, capable of adjusting the speed and intensity as new information becomes available. 
Moreover, it argues for implementation that initially favours policies with comparatively low multipliers 
and reforms that underpin credibility, but have little negative effect on demand in the short run. For 
example, pension reforms can have large effects on long-term sustainability and may have little negative 
effect in the short term. Indeed, insofar as postponed retirement reduces the need for future pensioners to 
save for retirement there could in principle even be a positive effect. 
The pace of consolidation 
25. Given high government debt-to-GDP ratios, some countries run the risk of unsustainable debt 
dynamics developing, especially if financing costs spike because of lack of credibility. While interest rates 
on government debt remain relatively low in many countries, debt levels in the wake of the crisis are 
significantly higher, implying latent upward pressure on borrowing costs. When interest rates are linked to 
government debt levels, this can tilt the case towards earlier consolidation. Even moderate delays may 
incur high costs with the development of particularly adverse debt dynamics (Corsetti et al., 2011). On 
average for the OECD, interest payments accounted for around 2.5% of GDP in 2007, but higher debt 
levels coupled with a normalisation of interest rates could push up interest payments to over 4% of GDP in 
2026 (OECD, 2011c). Thus, in countries which are particularly exposed to a financial market reaction the 
extent of consolidation may need to be larger and the pace faster than may be optimal if the main concern 
was the strength of the recovery. 
26. With policy rates low in many countries, and the zero lower bound still an important constraint, 
monetary policy is unlikely to be able to offer much support, arguing for a gradual phasing in of 
consolidation measures. As economies recover, monetary policy is less likely to be constrained by the zero 
bound and thus the pace of consolidation could be increased. Another argument for slower consolidation 
may arise when governments consolidate simultaneously; the implications for output are more severe due 
to international spillovers. Simulations reported in OECD (2009) suggest that multipliers increase by a 
factor of ¼-½ in major OECD regions when they consolidate jointly as opposed to individually. 
27. The impact of fiscal consolidation on economic activity will depend on the size and time profile 
of the fiscal multipliers (Barrell et al. 2012). Differences across countries are largely related to the size and 
openness of the economy, the size of the public sector, the degree of dependence of consumption on 
current income and also the flexibility of the economy. The multipliers in the NiGEM model tend to be 
largest for government consumption, whereas tax impulses tend to have lower multipliers than spending. 
The differences in multipliers across instruments suggest that the sequencing of fiscal consolidations could 
start with tax increases before cutting government spending, though political economy considerations may 
suggest otherwise. Beyond the model-based multipliers, pension reform that delay retirement may, as 
argued above, have particularly attractive features. 
Consequences of gradual and delayed consolidation needs 
28. When the state of fiscal policy doesn’t dictate the pace of consolidation, more gradual tightening 
may minimise the short term pain but require a larger overall amount of consolidation. Simulations for the 
United States, using the long-run model behind the fiscal gaps and therefore assuming no impact of 
consolidation on output, shows that gradual tightening could allow adverse debt dynamics to develop 
(Figure 5). Thus, too slow a consolidation may require further fiscal tightening to bring debt down to 
prudent levels. This arises because debt levels above a threshold of around 75% of GDP are assumed to 
incur a higher risk premium of four basis points for each additional percentage point of debt (Egert, 2010). 
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Using the model, fiscal gap calculations examining the consequences of a short delay to fiscal 
consolidation generally find that for most countries this has little effect on the necessary tightening, as long 
as the subsequent consolidation is large, as implied by the fiscal gap. However, for countries where actual 
debt is high or current deficit levels imply a particularly rapid run-up in debt, such as New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, even a short delay would visibly increase the required 
tightening of the underlying primary balance to reach prudent debt levels. 
Figure 5. The pace of fiscal tightening 
Evolution of gross financial liabilities for the United States when the underlying primary balance is tightened so that 
debt is 50% of GDP in 2050 and the consequences of phasing in the same tightening more gradually 
 
Long-term growth and choice of instruments 
29. The scale of consolidation needs suggests that consolidation should aim to use instruments that 
are friendly to long-term growth. In addition, supporting structural reforms can help, both through their 
implied effects on primary budget balances and to the extent higher growth is beneficial for debt dynamics. 
As concerns the primary balance and the respective contributions from lower spending and higher 
revenues, the “optimal” size of government is not known. However, the marginal net social costs 
- including the excess burden of taxation – of additional public spending are usually thought to increase 
more than proportionately with the additional taxation needed to finance spending. Hence, given the 
current high level of public spending in many OECD countries and the future spending pressures due to 
population ageing, a large part of consolidation probably should consist of cuts in public spending and 
addressing drivers of future spending pressures. In countries where spending is low, greater emphasis may 
have to be put on revenue measures. 
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Table 3. Quantifying the contribution of various policy instruments to fiscal consolidation 
Per cent of GDP 
 AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE CZE DEU DNK ESP FRA FIN GBR GRC HUN ISL 
                
1. Social transfers                
 A. Family benefits 0.5 0.7 0.6 - - 0.1 - 1.4 - 1.1 0.9 1.3 - 1.4 1.0 
 B. Disability benefits - 0.3 0.2 - 0.5 0.5 - 1.3 0.6 - 0.9 0.3 - 0.6 - 
2. Pensions                
 A. Eliminate tax breaks  2.7 0.1 0.1 2.0  0.1 0.8  0.2 0.0 0.1 1.2   1.0 
3. Health care                
  A. Increase efficiency 0.5 1.8 2.1 2.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 2.8 1.6 1.3 2.5 3.7 3.9 1.7 1.9 
4. Education                
  A. Increase efficiency in primary and secondary education 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2  0.2 0.2  0.3 1.1 
  B. Introduce or raise tuition fees for tertiary education - 0.4 0.4 - 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 - 0.4 0.4 0.3 
5. Government wage bill                
  A. Restore public-private sector pay relativities - 0.3 0.6 - - 0.4 0.2 2.0 1.0 - 0.5 1.8 - - - 
6.. Reduce subsidies as share of GDP to OECD average - 2.3 0.8 - 2.4 0.7 - 1.2 - 0.2 - - - - 0.4 
7. Broaden VAT base 0.6 - 1.4 - - - 0.4 - 1.4 1.4 0.1 1.8 2.0 0.1 0.8 
8. Introduce or increase taxes on immovable property - 0.8 0.6 - 0.9 0.8 0.6 - 0.3 - 0.5 - 0.8 0.7 - 
9. Environmental taxes                
  A. Cut GHG emissions to 20% below 1990 levels via an 
emission trading system with full permit auctioning 
4.2 1.8 1.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8  
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Table 3. Quantifying the contribution of various policy instruments to fiscal consolidation (continued) 
 IRL ITA JPN KOR LUX MEX NLD NZL NOR POL PRT SVK SWE TUR USA 
                
1. Social transfers                
 A. Family benefits 0.7 - - - 1.2 - 0.1 1.1 0.9 - - - 1.4 - - 
 B.  Disability benefits - - - - 0.1 - 0.8 0.7 1.8 0.6 0.3 - 1.3 - - 
2. Pensions                
 A. Eliminate tax breaks  1.2  0.0 0.7  0.5 0.2   0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2   0.8 
3. Health care                
  A. Increase efficiency 4.8  1.1 0.8 0.6 2.0 0.7 2.7 2.6 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.7 2.7 1.5 2.7 
4. Education                
  A. Increase efficiency in primary and secondary education 0.3  0.4 0.2 - 0.5 - 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 - 0.8 
  B. Introduce or raise tuition fees for tertiary education 0.3 0.2 - - 0.4 0.1 0.2 - 0.4 0.1 0.1 - 0.4 0.4 - 
5. Government wage bill                
  A. Restore public-private sector pay relativities 0.9  1.1 0.6 - 0.8 - 0.3 0.9 - 2.2 - 0.8 0.7 - 0.5 
6. Reduce subsidies as share of GDP to OECD average - - - - 0.2 - 0.1 - 0.7 - - 0.2 0.1 - - 
7. Broaden VAT base 0.4 2.6 - - - 2..5 - - 0.2 1.4 1.2 0.6 - 3.3  
8. Introduce or increase taxes on immovable property 0.2 0.4 - 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.4 - 0.7 - 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.9 - 
9. Environmental                
  A. Cut GHG emissions to 20% below 1990 levels via an ETS 
with full permit auctioning 
1.8 1.8 1.2  1.8  1.8 4.2  1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8  2.2 
Notes: 
An empty cell indicates that no information was available. Cells with a dash indicate that no savings are available from this source.  
Estimates for family benefits are based on reducing the figure reported in the OECD Socex Database to the unweighted OECD average as a per cent of GDP. 
Estimates for disability benefits are based on reducing the figure reported in the OECD Socex Database to the unweighted OECD average as a per cent of GDP. 
The elimination of tax breaks for retirement is based on data for 2007 from OECD (2011), Pensions at a Glance. 
Health care efficiency estimates are from Joumard et al. (2010). 
Education efficiency estimates are based on Sutherland et al. (2007) updated to 2007 spending figures.  
Tuition fees for tertiary education are based on raising direct household expenditure for tertiary education institutions to the unweighted average of those countries where households 
spend on this category.  
Government wage relativities are based on returning the government to private sector wage ratio in the early 2000s.  
Estimates for subsidies are based on reducing national account data for 2009 to the unweighted OECD average.  
The figures for broadening VAT base assume collection efficiency rises to the unweighted OECD average.  
The figures for immovable property are based on the unweighted average for 2008 from the Revenue Statistics. 
Revenues from greenhouse gas emissions are based on de Serres et al. (2010).  
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30. Given that spending cuts are largely unavoidable, a key question is how to maximise the positive 
and minimise the negative impacts on long-run growth, while at the same time considering other policy 
objectives such as equity concerns. In some cases, rethinking how distributional goals are achieved may 
offer scope to reduce transfers while encouraging greater labour force participation.  In other cases, scope 
to minimise costs exists by aiming to improve both allocative efficiency (better use of resources) and 
technical efficiency (maximising output for a given level of inputs). In most OECD countries, fiscal 
consolidation will also entail revenue reforms. There is scope to increase revenue by base broadening 
measures, particularly targeting so-called tax expenditures. When marginal rates need to go up, orientating 
measures towards those tax bases that have less distortionary effects can help to make fiscal consolidation 
on the revenue side less costly to long-term output. Finally, taxation of negative externalities may improve 
both welfare and public budgets. 
Instrument options 
Social transfers 
31. Reforms in a number of countries have aimed to transform social transfers so that vulnerable 
groups are protected while encouraging greater labour force attachment. This includes, for example, 
reforming previously unconditional unemployment benefit systems and re-orientating child and family 
benefits towards employment-conditional measures such as child-care support. In other cases, some 
transfers, such as disability benefits, have been prone to misuse. Measures which address inflows into 
disability rolls can be effective in reducing spending while encouraging greater labour force participation. 
If such measures allowed high spending countries to move towards the current cross-country average 
spending ratio on family and disability benefits, countries could enjoy savings of over 0.5% of GDP on 
average and up to almost 3% of GDP in some countries (Table 3), while boosting long-term output. 
Greater efficiency 
32. Work by the OECD has examined the opportunities to improve the efficiency in service delivery 
for health and education (similar savings are likely to be available in other spending programmes, 
Hagemann, 2011). These are important spending programmes accounting for about a quarter of 
government spending or on average across OECD countries around 10% of GDP between them. 
 No “one-size-fits-all” exists for health, in the sense that no “model” of health care delivery seems 
to be universally more cost efficient than other “models”. However, within each “model” 
countries achieve widely divergent degrees of cost efficiency, suggesting that optimisation at the 
margin rather than a switch of model is the best way to achieve savings. Indeed, adopting best 
practice policies could see potential efficiency gains in the region of 2% of GDP on average by 
2017 (Joumard et al., 2010), thereby allowing savings to be made without compromising service 
delivery (Figure 6, Table 3). 
 For primary and secondary education, schools adopting best practice measures could realise 
important savings, up to around 1% of GDP in some cases (Sutherland et al., 2007). The 
estimates for school savings are based on benchmarking individual school performance against 
the best performing schools with similar student populations and resources (using data 
envelopment analysis). The implications of reducing inefficiency are then translated into 
aggregate resource savings by the implied possible reduction in staffing costs (Figure 7, Table 3). 
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Figure 6. Potential savings from greater efficiency in public health care spending 
 
Figure 7. Potential savings from greater efficiency in primary and secondary education spending 
 
Source: Sutherland et al. (2007) 
Government wages 
33. Important gains can be achieved through management and pay reforms, and reducing the public 
sector wage bill is a candidate for fiscal consolidation in many countries. On average, the general 
government wage bill is close to 10% of GDP and accounts for roughly one quarter of overall spending. 
Indeed, there are countries where a large public-private sector wage gap has developed over time. 
Restoring the wage relativities in the early 2000s could yield significant savings in a number of countries 
(Table 3). Ireland and Hungary have demonstrated recently that substantial cuts in public sector wages can 
be implemented if there is an urgent need for consolidation and a case arising from public-private pay 
Source:  Joumard et al.  (2010b).
Note:  Potential savings represent the difference between a no-reform scenario and a scenario where countries would exploit 
efficiency gains. The no-reform scenario assumes that between 2007 and 2017 life expectancy and spending increase at the 
same pace as over the previous 10 years and that the mix between public and private spending remains constant over time.
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relativities. That said, comparing public and private remuneration levels poses serious challenges, and 
requires valuation of working conditions and non-wage remuneration, such as defined benefit pension 
schemes. The ultimate test of adequacy is likely to be the difficulty or ease of recruitment into and 
retention in the civil service. From this perspective, budgetary savings achievable through reductions in the 
government wage bill should best be the outcome of a thorough review rather than across-the-board or 
arbitrary cuts in pay. 
Subsidies 
34. Subsidy reduction should rank high on the policy agenda as many subsidies may have surpassed 
their initial intended objective and may now have adverse economic effects. The elimination of subsidies 
(as defined in the national accounts), to the average for the OECD could yield sizeable savings in a number 
of countries (Table 3). Furthermore, by reducing the distortions they create, cutting subsidies offers the 
potential to boost growth. 
Tuition fees 
35. Close to a quarter of public spending on education is to support tertiary education, including 
tuition-free attendance in many countries, especially in continental Europe. A large share of returns to 
publicly-funded tertiary education accrue to individuals rather than to society (Blöndal et al., 2002), and 
although some of the private returns are reduced by progressive taxes continued generous public support 
for higher education can be questioned. This is more so given the greater prevalence of tertiary education 
among middle and upper income households. The introduction or increase of tuition fees may also improve 
educational outcomes, by making schools more responsive to market demands, with long-term gains to 
human capital, the quality of labour supply, the economy’s rate of potential growth, and overall fairness. 
Introducing or raising tuition fees to the average spending in countries that use tuition fees could yield 
additional revenues of around 0.4% of GDP (Table 3). Concerns that such reforms would reduce enrolment 
by students from poor backgrounds could to a large extent be addressed by loan programmes with 
repayment conditional on subsequent income level.  
Tax expenditures 
36. All OECD governments use tax expenditures to promote a range of policy objectives. The scope 
of tax expenditures varies greatly across OECD countries, but they account for very substantial revenue 
leakages in some cases. Not all tax expenditures are undesirable, though, as some improve equity-
efficiency trade-offs, like the case of earned income tax credits. Many, however, are distorting, poorly 
targeted, and contribute to a lack of transparency. In some cases, estimates of the revenues forgone by a tax 
expenditure can exceed a percentage point of GDP and the aggregate impact of all tax expenditures is 
likely to exceed several percentage points of GDP in most OECD countries. Typically, the most costly tax 
expenditures are those aimed at boosting retirement savings, promoting homeownership, health insurance 
and charitable giving (OECD, 2010a). 
37. Two examples reveal the potential importance for consolidation of reforming tax expenditures in 
personal income tax: 
 Tax-favoured treatment of saving for retirement is found to boost retirement savings per se, but 
there is scant evidence that it raises aggregate private saving. Instead, such tax breaks result in a 
reallocation of saving from non-tax preferred to tax-preferred vehicles, while causing substantial 
revenue leakages, which may even reduce aggregate national saving. Phasing out such incentives 
could yield 1.7% of GDP or more in additional revenues on average across a sample of OECD 
countries (Antolin et al., 2004). 
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 Preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is one of the costliest tax preferences in 
many OECD countries. The most important source of housing-related revenue leakages arises 
from the tax exemption granted to the implicit rental income of the owner-occupied home. 
Whereas the owner of a residence that is rented pays tax on the rental payments (less interest and 
operational costs), the implicit rental income of the owner-occupant is tax-exempt in the vast 
majority of member countries, except in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
6
 Despite the 
exclusion of the implicit rental income, some countries nevertheless allow the deductibility of 
mortgage interest, as well as property taxes (normally paid at the sub-national level). In addition, 
many countries provide favourable treatment to long-term capital gains from the sale of owner-
occupied housing, adding further to the post-tax attractiveness of investment in housing. Thus, by 
removing a bias favourable to owner-occupied housing, reform could not only increase revenue 
but also improve the allocation of capital, boosting growth. 
38. There are also important tax expenditures in indirect taxation. While VAT is widely recognised 
as an efficient and buoyant revenue source, its revenue potential is not fully used. Indeed, with the 
exception of New Zealand, a substantial portion of potential revenue is foregone in most countries due to a 
combination of reduced VAT rates, a narrow base, and low compliance (Figure 8). There is thus 
considerable scope for boosting revenue through VAT reforms (Table 4). Direct fiscal consolidation aside, 
broadening the base and reducing the number of rates offer scope to improve administration and 
compliance, by reducing complexity and countering political pressure for additional low rates. A more 
effective means to meet distributional objectives may be to target compensatory increased cash transfers or 
refundable tax credits to compensate low-income households. 
Figure 8. Value added tax performance: the VAT revenue ratio 
Average 2007-08 
 
Note:  The VAT revenue ratio measures the difference between the VAT revenue actually collected and what would theoretically be 
raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to the entire potential tax base in a “pure” VAT regime and all revenue was 
collected: The VAT revenue ratio equals VAT Revenue/(Consumption * Standard VAT rate)*100. 
Source: OECD (2011), Consumption Tax Trends 2010: VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Administration Issues. 
39. Financial services are typically exempted from the VAT, largely due to technical difficulties in 
determining the precise tax base for margin-based services (i.e., intermediation). Since much of VAT paid 
                                                     
6. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, however, taxable imputed rentals are very low, which combined with 
mortgage interest deductibility acts to reduce personal income tax revenues significantly. 
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by financial service providers on inputs is non-recoverable, the sector’s VAT exemption causes a number 
of economic distortions that result in more household consumption of financial services, and less use of 
and greater self-provision of financial services by businesses. However, the evolution of accounting 
methods and information systems has reduced the technical obstacles to imposing VAT on financial 
services considerably (OECD, 2010b). Moreover, following the recent financial crisis, there is increased 
interest among governments in both raising revenue from financial institutions and reducing moral hazard 
in the financial services sector via new taxes on financial services or (elements of) balance sheets. 
Less distortionary tax bases 
40. When tax rates need to be raised, some taxes are natural candidates for fiscal consolidation 
programmes both from an efficiency and revenue-raising perspective. The efficiency costs of taxes on 
immobile property are lower than on consumption or income, but represent a small share of overall tax 
revenue in many OECD countries.
7
 Where they are low or non-existent, corrective taxes such as so-called 
“sin” taxes that can help deter harmful behaviours (e.g. alcohol and tobacco consumption), or taxes on 
polluting activities or consumption (e.g. fossil fuels) can improve welfare while boosting revenues. 
41. Environmental taxes hold the promise of both boosting revenue and helping to achieve 
environmental objectives by discouraging pollution. While some countries raise considerable revenues 
from such taxes, reaching 4% of GDP in Denmark and the Netherlands in 2008, their yield is relatively low 
in several countries, notably Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Nonetheless, imposing a tax on 
carbon emissions or auctioning tradable emission rights to contain greenhouse gas emissions has become 
more widespread. For example, the European Union has auctioned permits as part of the Emission Trading 
Scheme. Despite such developments, many countries maintain differences in taxation depending on fuel 
type that run counter to estimates of environmental externalities. From a fiscal consolidation perspective, 
greenhouse gas levies consistent with international action to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases by 2020, could generate around 2% of GDP (de Serres et al., 2010) (Table 4). 
Summing up potential for primary balance adjustment 
42. Table 5 brings together estimates quoted above on the potential contributions of spending and 
revenue measures to fiscal consolidation and could inform a choice of where potential may exist to make 
savings or increase revenues. Even without being able to quantify all the possible measures across 
countries, and not taking into account any dynamic effects, the cumulative potential cuts in spending 
(benchmarked using the OECD average or estimates of potential efficiency gains) and increases in taxation 
(benchmarked using the OECD average) are sizeable. On average across countries, budget enhancements 
could reach around 7% of GDP, with the larger part available on the spending side. Given that there are 
measures that are difficult to quantify this is a lower estimate. Furthermore, the potential tends to be 
somewhat greater in the English-speaking countries which generally face the larger consolidation needs. A 
large share of the savings in spending would come from reaping efficiency gains, which are likely to take 
some time to emerge. On the revenue side, relatively large opportunities exist for the greater use of 
environmental taxes and the broadening of income and indirect tax bases. 
Supporting reforms 
43. In a number of cases supporting reforms could assist fiscal consolidation. Aside from their direct 
budgetary impact, as discussed above, reforms to pension systems that delay retirement and increase labour 
force participation will boost revenues and thereby reduce long-run budget pressures. Reforms that link 
                                                     
7. In most countries, property taxes are a main source of finance for sub-national governments, posing 
potentially challenging fiscal federalism problems should national property taxes be introduced or raised. 
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retirement age to gains in longevity would thus help cushioning budgets against future changes in 
longevity. More generally, growth-enhancing structural policy reform may support fiscal consolidation. 
This is most obvious when reforms, such as retirement reforms, lead to a higher sustainable employment 
level because such a change will have a permanent impact on the primary balance (Figure 9). The size of 
the effect will depend on the taxes levied on the additional income and consumption created as well as on 
whether the reform in question has any direct budgetary impact. The latter will be the case, for example, 
when additional spending on active labour market policy boosts aggregate spending or cutbacks on 
unemployment benefit duration reduces it. But many structural reforms have little direct impact on budgets 
while at the same time boosting employment levels, such as in the case of product market reforms that 
boost competition. 
Figure 9. Effect of 1% higher potential employment on the primary balance 
Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 88 database; and OECD calculations. 
44. The effects of productivity-enhancing structural reforms on public budgets are less clear. Higher 
productivity in the private sector will tend to boost revenues but also spending unless public/private wage 
relativities change or transfer income replacement ratios are altered. Hence, the effect on the primary 
budget balance may be muted. However, to the extent higher productivity growth is not matched by a 
corresponding increase in real interest rates debt dynamics will be favourably affected. Such an effect is 
particularly likely for individual countries participating in a monetary union since the general structure of 
interest rates is unlikely to be strongly affected by structural reform in an individual country while at the 
same time higher growth may lead to a narrowing of risk premia. 
Conclusions 
45. Overall, the link between economic growth and the post-crisis debt overhang is complicated. On 
the one hand, high debt seems to be associated with lower growth. But, on the other hand, fiscal 
consolidation may weaken growth both in the near term and over a longer horizon. Realistically, debt 
problems are so serious in many countries that consolidation has the potential to hamper growth strongly. 
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46. In the short run, consolidation may weaken demand and monetary policy may not be able to 
compensate for such effects for some time to come. This argues for phasing in consolidation. Appropriate 
and clear fiscal objectives together with institutions that ensure accountability may help to preserve 
credibility in the process. However, to maintain credibility it may also be necessary to take some action up-
front, in which case instruments with small short-term multipliers may be given some weight. This may 
involve some political economy risk, to the extent it skews consolidation towards inappropriate 
instruments. Slow consolidation may also entail a price insofar as it involves higher debt and thereby 
higher interest rates. 
47. In the longer run, effects of consolidation on growth will depend on the choice of instruments. 
Some instruments are available that will have limited detrimental impacts on growth and little or no 
conflict with other policy objectives. Notably, increasing spending efficiency, reforming unsustainable 
pension systems, putting prices on environmental externalities and maximising the benefits of structural 
reforms could make sizeable contributions to consolidation. In addition, reviewing tax and benefit systems 
more generally could help identify how policy objectives could be achieved at lower cost and where 
support is less justified. 
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APPENDIX: FISCAL GAPS 
48. The underlying model used to calculate fiscal gaps is deliberately simple (Merola and Sutherland, 
2011). It builds on the assumptions underlying the Economic Outlook medium-term baseline on potential 
output growth, output gaps, interest and inflation rates until 2025. Between 2025 and 2050, GDP growth is 
determined by the growth rate of potential, which is driven by demographic developments and assumptions 
about productivity growth. The fiscal side of the model assumes that revenues adjusted for the cycle 
remain a constant share of GDP and, in the baseline, primary spending is also a constant share of GDP. 
49. For any long-run fiscal projections, GDP growth, interest rates and inflation together with the 
fiscal assumptions determine long-run sustainability (Appendix Table). In the country models the main 
assumptions are as follows: 
 GDP growth in the long term is driven by potential output. One of the main components of 
potential output that is varying over time is working age population growth, which is based on 
cohort data from long-term demographic projections. GDP growth is then determined by 
participation rates and employment and labour productivity growth. The latter is assumed to 
converge to 1.75% by 2035 at the latest. The simulations ignore possible impacts of fiscal policy 
and debt developments on output. 
 Interest rates on government borrowing are partly determined by monetary policy. The return of 
output to potential is accompanied by a normalisation of interest rates, such that the risk-free rate 
is at its estimated natural rate by 2025. Inflation converges to the monetary authorities’ target, 
typically 2% annually. Interest payments are determined by the stock of debt and an interest rate 
that is based on a mix of long and short-term rates, with the long-term rate including a premium 
of 4 basis points for each percentage point of financial liabilities in excess of 75% of GDP. Japan 
is assumed to remain unusual, with the very high share of domestic financing keeping the risk 
premium at only 1 basis point for each percentage point of financial liabilities in excess of 75% 
of GDP. 
 The other major assumptions concern fiscal policy. In the baseline, underlying revenues and 
primary spending are constant as shares of GDP, though the automatic stabilisers operate while 
the economy moves back to potential. In some scenarios, ageing-related spending is added to 
underlying spending to highlight the fiscal pressures coming from population ageing. For health 
care, given that only a relatively small portion of the projected increase is ageing-related, 
additional spending is phased in linearly over the projection horizon. 
50. The fiscal gaps are distinct from recent work by the OECD that has assessed the consolidation 
requirements to stabilise debt (OECD, 2011c). These requirements are based on stylised assumptions about 
a sustained gradual annual tightening of the underlying primary balance by 0.5% of GDP until debt 
stabilization is reached. The fiscal gaps on the other hand make the alternative stylised assumption that the 
tightening will be implemented immediately and sustained until 2050 to meet a specific debt target. Both 
sets of assumptions ignore the implications for output, which will obviously be important. 
51. Overall the two approaches produce similar rankings of consolidation needs across counties 
(Appendix Figure). The two approaches differ in three ways. First the time path of consolidation is 
different. Second, the final debt level is different. Third, the time horizon is different. The first and third 
differences in particular pull in opposite directions for the two approaches. The combined effect of the 
differences leads to the additional tightening to bring debt down to 50% of GDP in 2050 being typically 
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not much greater than the gradual fiscal tightening needed after 2012 to stabilise debt levels. In general, the 
immediate consolidation assumed by the fiscal gap calculations is sufficient to bring debt dynamics under 
control more quickly which combined with the assumption that the fiscal tightening is permanent over a 
longer time horizon will see debt levels gradually fall for the rest of the simulation. The estimates of the 
amount of consolidation needed to stabilise debt are particularly large for the United States and Japan and 
the gradual tightening takes considerably longer to stabilise debt. As a higher interest premium for each 
percentage point of debt above 75% of GDP is assumed for the United States than Japan, the consequences 
of the gradual tightening for adverse debt dynamics are more severe, which explains why the relationship 
with the fiscal gap estimates differs from the other countries. If countries do not need to consolidate to 
meet the terminal debt target, such as in the case of Sweden, no fiscal gap is calculated and the country is 
excluded from the figure. 
Appendix Table. Key assumptions in the baseline simulation 
 
Starting point, 2012 Average over simulation 
 
Gross debt, % 
of GDP 
Underlying primary  
balance, % of GDP 
Effective interest 
rate 
Nominal  
GDP growth 
Australia 31 0.6 6.9 4.8 
Austria 82 0.1 4.4 3.5 
Belgium 100 0.9 4.7 3.8 
Canada 88 -1.8 4.9 4.2 
Czech Republic 51 0.3 4.4 4.2 
Denmark 60 0.8 5.0 3.5 
Finland 66 0.8 4.2 3.9 
France 100 -0.6 4.1 3.6 
Germany 87 0.6 4.3 3.0 
Greece 159 3.5 5.5 3.4 
Hungary 81 1.1 5.8 3.2 
Ireland 126 -0.4 4.7 4.3 
Italy 128 3.3 4.6 3.1 
Japan 219 -4.2 3.0 2.2 
Korea 33 0.5 5.6 2.4 
Luxembourg 24 2.0 4.5 4.9 
Netherlands 75 0.0 4.3 3.5 
New Zealand 52 -4.0 5.8 4.3 
Poland 66 -1.5 5.3 3.2 
Portugal 116 3.5 4.6 3.1 
Slovak Republic 51 -1.7 5.1 2.8 
Spain 75 0.5 4.2 3.5 
Sweden 41 2.6 4.7 4.0 
Switzerland 37 1.2 2.9 2.9 
United Kingdom 93 -3.0 4.6 4.1 
United States 107 -5.8 4.6 4.3 
  32 
Appendix Figure. Relation between fiscal gaps and consolidation requirements 
 
Source: OECD (2011c), OECD Economic Outlook 89. 
 
